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Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that family background and parental
criminality are strong predictors of an individuals’ criminal behavior.
The aim of this paper is to account for this intergenerational nature of
criminal behavior within a simple theoretical model. Drawing on the
literature of cultural transmission, we model the dynamics of moral
norms of good conduct (honest behavior). Individuals’ criminal behav-
ior and morality are strategic complementarities that reinforce each
other. We establish the existence of multiple steady states and provide
conditions on the socialization process under which both types - honest
and dishonest - survive in the long run even though parents commit
crime but at the same time agree that honesty is desirable. Our model
provides a novel explanation of why crime is highly concentrated in spe-
cific areas and also why crime rates tend to be persistent over time. An
empirical application reveals that our model can account for the differ-
ential reductions in property crime rates across US federal states since
the 1980s.
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1 Introduction
...I never wanted this for you [Michael]...I always thought that when it was
your time, that you would be the one to hold the strings. Senator Corleone,
Governor Corleone, something.
– Vito Corleone
It is a well established fact that crime runs in the family. Despite having
a long history in criminology1, the familial nature of criminal behavior has
only recently attracted the interest of the economics of crime literature, see
Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (2012, 2013) and Duncan et al. (2005).2 Accord-
ing to these studies, family background and, in particular, parental crimi-
nality are among the most relevant predictors of an individual’s criminal
behavior, more important even than own income or employment status. Hjal-
marsson and Lindquist (2012), for example, show that a son (daughter) with
a criminal father has 2.06 (2.66) times higher odds of having a criminal con-
viction than a son (daughter) with a noncriminal father and that parents’
behavior and socialization processes may account for a large share of this
intergenerational crime relationship. The aim of this paper is to rationalize
this stylized fact within a theoretical model based on the cultural transmis-
sion of moral values and socialization within the family.
The idea that preferences, beliefs and moral norms are transmitted through
generations and adopted by learning and other forms of social interaction
has recently received considerable attention in the economic literature. In-
deed, based on some studies on sociology and anthropology (see in particular
Boyd and Richerson (1985), Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981)), many stud-
ies, following the seminal papers of Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001), argue
that the transmission of a particular trait (social status, religion, ethnicity,
etc.) is the result of a socialization process inside and outside the family (like
e.g. role models and peers).
In our model, to account for the familial nature of criminal behavior, we
consider the formation of an ‘honesty’ trait. Individuals’ decisions to com-
mit crime are not only affected by economic incentives but are also influ-
enced by rules of good conduct and morality inherited from previous gener-
ations.3 Parents rationally anticipate that their own criminal behavior has
1See Rowe and Farrington (1997) and the historical references therein. Thornberry
(2009) provides a thorough review of the criminology literature.
2See also Eriksson et al. (2014) for an attempt to quantify the relative importance of
family background and neighborhood effects in determining criminal behavior.
3See also Tabellini (2008) who studies the cultural transmission of a norm that affects
individuals’ decisions to behave cooperatively in situations like for example, the Prisoner’s
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a negative impact on the transmission process of the ‘honesty’ trait. More
specifically, the transmission process encompasses direct socialization inside
the family and indirect socialization via neighborhood effects and social in-
teractions (horizontal and oblique socialization). This creates a strategic
complementarity between current behavior and values, which reinforces the
effects of changes in exogenous variables and in the external environment
(e.g. crime deterrence or education policies)4. The more individuals commit
crime, the lower is the likelihood of successfully transmitting positive moral
values which in turn expands the share of individuals with norms of bad
conduct in society. Thus, policies aimed at deterring criminal behavior may
not only alter economic incentives but also have long-lasting and amplifying
effects through changes in the cultural transmission process.
Our analysis is related to the literature on cultural transmission and
the economics of crime. However, in contrast to most of the cultural trans-
mission literature (see e.g. Bisin and Verdier (2000) and Bisin and Verdier
(2011)), we assume that all parents, irrespective of their type, agree that
one of the traits (honesty) is superior.5 We further assume that the parents’
criminal behavior (rather than effort) has a direct negative impact on the
children’s probability of adopting the honest trait. While the standard as-
sumption in the literature is that the transmission process requires some
costly effort without further specification of its nature or the kind of activi-
ties necessary to produce it, we suggest that the observation of the parents’
behavior by their kin is the mechanism through which children may assimi-
late the cultural traits of their parents. This is consistent with recent empir-
ical evidence on the intergenerational nature of criminal behavior (see e.g.
Hjalmarsson and Lindquist (2012, 2013)) and allows us to establish a clear
difference between the distribution of traits and actual observed behavior.
Specifically, even individuals with norms of good conduct may commit crime
if it is economically profitable (and, similarly, individuals with norms of bad
Dilemma. Similarly, Hauk and Sáez-Marti (2002) analyze the evolution of morality and
corruption.
4Glaeser et al. (2003) refer to this mechanism as the ‘social multiplier’.
5Although it seems reasonable that parents try to transmit their own cultural trait when
it comes to language or religion, this is different regarding traits and values associated with
poor economic outcomes and low socioeconomic status (e.g. working in the informal economy,
crime, etc.). So far there are only three studies exploring the theoretical implications when
parents with different traits agree on which trait is desirable: Patacchini and Zenou (2011)
focus on educational outcomes, Sáez-Marti and Zenou (2012) on work ethics whereas Sáez-
Marti and Sjögren (2008) model the merit-guided learning on the part of children. Our
analysis complements these studies by exploring the transmission of moral values and their
role in determining criminal behavior.
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conduct need not commit crime if it is not economically profitable).6 More-
over, and importantly, the interplay between economic incentives and cul-
tural transmission implies that parents may deliberately transmit the bad
trait to their children as a by-product of their own behavior even though they
agree that it is not the desired one. This case is novel to the literature.7
Another important ingredient of our model is the assumption that cul-
tural transmission may be biased in favor of one particular trait or depends
on the relative frequency of the trait in the population (see Boyd and Richer-
son (1985) and Sáez-Marti and Sjögren (2008)). The main idea behind this
kind of oblique transmission process is that children learn from a large group
of randomly selected peers (instead of a single one, which is the standard as-
sumption in the literature).8 With unbiased (or linear) oblique transmission
and positive levels of crime for all types of parents, however, the unique
possible steady state is the one in which all individuals acquire the unde-
sired trait even though all parents agree on which trait is desirable. By con-
trast, with frequency-dependent or negative bias, we show that both traits
can co-exist in equilibrium even if all parents commit crime. In the case of
frequency-dependent transmission the extinction of the honest type may oc-
cur if the fraction of holders in society is large enough. The children’s bias
thus affects the actual equilibrium proportions. Specifically, biased transmis-
sion may imply multiple steady state equilibria such that initial conditions
regarding the distribution of cultural traits may determine whether there
will be diversity or assimilation in the long run. Therefore, contrary to pre-
vious papers, our theory can explain why criminal behavior persists even
though parents agree that norms of good conduct (honesty) are desirable.
Furthermore, we show that the introduction of a public education campaign
not only implies that culture will always be diverse - independent of the chil-
dren’s bias - but also that it is a powerful policy instrument to fight criminal
behavior.
The equilibrium multiplicity can also be used to explain the spatial pat-
tern of crime observed in the United States. Indeed, a positive relation-
ship between urban size and crime rates is a well-established empirical fact
6Conley and Wang (2006) use a similar approach to model the crime decision taking into
account the degree of honesty of individuals. In their model, however, moral values are
exogenously given.
7The main idea is also captured by Vito Corleone’s initial quote from the famous movie
The Godfather. Even though Vito never wanted his son Michael to be involved in the family’s
criminal enterprize, and actually hoped he would go into politics, in the end, Michael could
not escape the criminal influence of his family.
8The importance of peer and neighbor effects in determining criminal behavior has re-
cently been emphasized by Glaeser et al. (1996), Bayer et al. (2009) and Damm and Dust-
mann (2014).
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(Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999); Kahn (2010)). For example, the rate of prop-
erty crime in cities with more than 250,000 population is 1,144 per 100.000,
and 875 per 100,000 in places under 10,000 in population. Similar patterns
can be found for violent or other types of crimes (Glaeser, 1998).
Existing social interaction models of crime behavior focus either on social
interactions with peers and neighbors (see e.g. Patacchini and Zenou (2012),
Calvo-Armengol et al. (2007), Ballester et al. (2006, 2010), Calvo-Armengol
and Zenou (2004), Glaeser et al. (1996)) or on externalities related to the
number of criminals in specific areas (e.g. Conley and Wang (2006), Free-
man et al. (1996), Sah (1991))9. Our model complements these studies by
explicitly modeling the role of socialization within the family as a crucial
determinant of criminal behavior which has been neglected so far. In fact,
our analysis is the first to formally explore the intergenerational nature of
criminal behavior. Our paper thereby not only adds further insights towards
understanding the cause of multiple equilibria in crime models but also pro-
vides a novel and reasonable explanation for the existence of a differential in
criminal activity across space and time, in particular the geographical con-
centration of crime activity and the phenomenon of urban ghettos (see e.g.
Grogger and Willis (2000)).
Furthermore, an empirical application reveals that our model can ac-
count for the differential reductions in property crime rates across US fed-
eral states since the 1980s. Indeed, despite similar changes of economic
variables and increases in the size of crime deterrence expenditures, states
with almost the same crime rates in the late 70s may end up with com-
pletely different levels of crime in mid 2000. According to our theory, the
(non-)existence of a social multiplier effect may be the key explanatory fac-
tor of why crime tends to be relatively persistent in some states whereas
anti crime policies may have a large impact in others.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, es-
tablishes the existence of multiple steady states and presents comparative
static results. Section 3 introduces a public education campaign into the ba-
sic framework and analyzes the consequences for the cultural transmission
process and the existence of crime equilibria. Section 4 relates the theoreti-
cal findings of our model to data on crime in the US. Section 5 concludes.
9See Zenou (2003) for an overview. Empirical evidence for these explanations is provided
by Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999), Kling et al. (2005), Ludwig et al. (2001), Bayer et al. (2009)
and Sah (1991).
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2 The Basic Model
We consider a society populated by overlapping generations where the size of
each generation is normalized to one. All agents live for two periods. When
young (first period), individuals acquire their preferences; when old (second
period), they become parents, have one child and decide how to split their
time between joining the labor force and engaging in criminal activities.10
Each old individual may either possess a high productivity θh or a low pro-
ductivity θl to earn income in the legal market. We denote the time invariant
share of individuals with low productivity in the economy by η. The ability
to commit crime is assumed to be the same for all individuals11 and the net
return from committing crime depends on economic factors (market income,
apprehension probability, individuals’ ability) and on moral norms of good
conduct which are in turn determined by a transmission and socialization
process from their parents.
In the following, we first consider how young agents adopt these cultural
traits which in turn affect economic outcomes during old-age.
2.1 The transmission process
There are two different types of cultural traits in society, L and H. These
types are referred to as dishonest and honest, respectively. Parents are al-
truistic and care about the type of their children. In contrast to most of the
existing literature, however, we consider that all parents, independently of
their own type, agree that one of the traits (honesty) is preferable.12 This
is consistent with evidence by Rowe and Farrington (1997) who show that
even criminal fathers disapprove their son’s offending.13 Socialization af-
fects the adoption of traits only during childhood so that adult individuals
keep the acquired trait throughout their lifetime. As in Bisin and Verdier
(2000, 2001), the transmission of traits is modeled as a combination of so-
10Similar assumptions can, e.g., been found in Block and Heineke (1975) and Lochner
(2004). Note further that we normalize the individuals’ time endowment to one.
11There is no empirical evidence of a clear positive correlation between the market pro-
ductivity and the skills to commit a crime, that is, individuals with high productivity are
not more productive in the crime sector (see for example Lochner (2004) and Lochner and
Moretti (2004)).
12By contrast, Tabellini (2008), and also Hauk and Sáez-Marti (2002) and Bisin and
Verdier (2000), assume that parents prefer their own trait.
13Indirect evidence in favor of this assumption also comes from survey data. In the re-
sponse to NORC’s General Social Survey’s question, ‘Which three of the qualities listed
would you say are the most desirable for a child to have?’, ‘honesty’ is the most cited quality
across the sample (Bisin and Verdier, 2011, p.394).
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cialization inside the family (vertical socialization, namely the parents’ be-
havior) and socialization outside the family (oblique socialization, namely
the social environment where children live). However, in contrast to the
existing theoretical literature, but consistent with evidence in Hjalmarsson
and Lindquist (2012) and others, we posit that the parents’ behavior (the
decision to commit crime) rather than effort has a direct positive effect on
the probability of the child adopting the bad type through vertical transmis-
sion, e.g. through social learning or adopting parental role models. Still, the
probability of adopting a specific type also depends on peer group effects and
thus on socialization by society through a process of oblique transmission.
The importance of peer group effects in determining criminal behavior has
been emphasized, e.g., by Damm and Dustmann (2014), Bayer et al. (2009)
and Glaeser et al. (1996).
More formally, let µt (1−µt) be the proportion of L-type (H-type) adults
and xL,kt ∈ [0,1] (xH,kt ∈ [0,1]) the fraction of time a L-type (H-type) parent
with ability k= h, l devotes to criminal activities in period t. Then, the total
probability that the child of an L-type (H-type) adopts L (resp. H) is given
by:
PLLk = xL,kt + (1− xL,kt )S(µt) (1)
PLHk = (1− xL,kt )(1−S(µt)) (2)
PHHk = (1− xH,kt )(1−S(µt)) (3)
PHLk = xH,kt + (1− xH,kt )S(µt) (4)
where S(µt) captures the process of oblique transmission, namely how chil-
dren are influenced by society (peers). Before discussing the properties of
the transmission function S(µt) in more detail, we first interpret equations
(1)-(4). The child of a dishonest parent will also be dishonest with probability
equal to the parents’ time spent on criminal activities (eq.1). If this direct
transmission fails (with probability 1− xL,kt ), the child acquires the dishon-
est trait from his/her neighborhood (with probability S(µt)). The probability
that a child of dishonest parents becomes honest is defined by equation (2).
This may only happen if the child does not acquire the bad trait from either
his/her parents or his/her peers. For honest parents (equations (3) and (4)),
the interpretation is similar. Note further that an increase in the parents’
criminal activities unambiguously lowers the probability of the children to
adopt the good trait, i.e. ∂P iH /∂xi,kt < 0, i = L,H, k= h, l.
The oblique transmission function S : [0,1]→ [0,1] is assumed to be twice
continuously differentiable and increasing such that S(0) = 0 and S(1) = 1.
The standard assumption in the literature is that children are randomly
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matched to one role model who provide them the trait to copy. This results
in an unbiased oblique transmission function, S(µt) = µt, so that children
acquire each of the traits with a probability equal to their share in the pop-
ulation. Following Sáez-Marti and Sjögren (2008) and Boyd and Richerson
(1985), however, we assume that oblique transmission may well be biased.
Such biases result if the peer group children interact with is of fixed size
and consists of randomly-drawn individuals from the whole population, and
children evaluate the relative merit of the variants of traits observed in this
group. Specifically, three different cases are distinguished in the sociobiolog-
ical literature:
• Positive bias: the probability that the naive agent adopts type L is
always larger than if he had acquired one role model randomly, S(µt)>
µt for all µt ∈ (0,1).
• Negative bias: the probability that the naive agent adopts type L
is always smaller than if he had acquired one role model randomly,
S(µt)<µt for all µt ∈ (0,1).
• Conformism or frequency-dependent bias: when the frequency of trait
L in the population is smaller (larger) than µˆt, the probability that a
naive agent adopts L is decreased (increased) relative to the unbiased
transmission, S(µt)Tµt for µtTµˆt. ‘Pure’ conformism corresponds to
µˆt = 1/2.
A graphical representation of the different cases is provided by Figure 1.
µ
S(
µ)
µ
S(
µ)
µ
S(
µ)
Figure 1: Positive bias (left), frequency-dependent bias (middle) and nega-
tive bias (right).
2.2 The parents’ decision
We now turn to the analysis of the parents’ decision to engage in criminal
activities. This decision depends on economic incentives as well as on type-
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dependent moral costs, γi, (i =H,L). Furthermore, as explained in the pre-
vious section, parents are altruistic and care about their children’s type.
Risk neutral parents maximize utility
U i,kt = (1−xi,kt )(1−λ(1+φ))θk+ρλxi,kt θ˜−(1−ρ)ψ−γi
(xi,kt )
2
2
+β
(
P iHk γ
H +P iLk γL
)
(5)
subject to equations (1)-(4) by choosing the fraction of time devoted to crim-
inal activities xi,kt , (i = H,L, k = h, l). This utility function has a stan-
dard cost/benefit structure established by the seminal contribution of Becker
(1968). The benefits from the criminal activity are given by ρλxi,kt θ˜ and are
increasing in the average legal market income θ˜ = ηθL+(1−η)θH , the fraction
of income that can be stolen λ and the probability of not being apprehended
ρ.14
The costs of committing crimes are measured by the probability of being
caught 1−ρ times the fine ψ (which is a minimum level of income in case
a criminal is caught) and the opportunity costs of forgone earnings in the
legal sector (1−λ(1+φ))θk (k = L,H). The parameter φ ∈ [0, (1−λ)/λ[ cap-
tures additional monetary costs incurred when being victimized, e.g. broken
windows or doors, time spent reporting the crime to the police, etc. Also, as
in Conley and Wang (2006) and Verdier and Zenou (2004), agents have a
type-dependent moral cost of committing crime equal to γi(xi,kt )
2/2 (i =H,L),
where γi captures their degree of honesty. So the higher γi and the crime
effort, the higher the moral cost.
Finally, the last term of the utility function captures the altruistic con-
cern and β the degree of altruism. We employ a joy-of-giving formulation15
as the modeling of the children’s utility is beyond the scope of this paper.
The important aspect here is that the type adopted by the child affects his
well-being in adult life by shaping moral concerns regarding criminal behav-
ior and that parents care about this. More specifically, an increase in the
fraction of time spent on criminal activities enhances the probability of the
child adopting the L-type and thus reduces the utility from the altruistic
concern.16
14For technical simplicity, we have assumed that each agent is equally sensitive to being
the victim of a crime and each criminal steals a share of average income in the economy,
that is, criminals cannot monitor and pick up their victims based on their income (see Imro-
horoglu et al. (2004, 2006) and Bethencourt (2014)).
15See e.g. Andreoni (1990). Alternatively, we could assume that parents care about some
type-dependent and exogenously given level of their children’s utility. This would not affect
our results.
16In fact, it is straightforward to prove that P iHk γ
H +P iLk γL is decreasing in x
i,k
t (i =H,L,
k= h,k).
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Solving the parents’ maximization problem gives the optimal fraction of
time spent on criminal activities:
xi,kt =
1
γi
(
ρλθ˜− (1−λ(1+φ))θk−β(1−S(µt))(γH −γL)
)
(6)
with k = h, l and i = H,L. Clearly, the optimal share xi,kt is increasing in
the average market income θ˜, the share of income that can be stolen λ and
the probability of not being apprehended ρ whereas it is decreasing in indi-
viduals’ productivity in market activities θk, the relative size of the level of
moral costs for both types γH −γL and the probability with which children
acquire the honest trait from their neighborhood 1−S(µt) (which is in turn
negatively related to the share of dishonest types in society). Consequently,
horizontal transmission and parents’ time spend on criminal activities are
complements as parents spend more time on criminal activities the larger
the share of individuals with the dishonest trait in society.
2.3 Dynamics and steady states
Given equation (6), the dynamics of the population of agents with type L are
then determined by the following difference equation:
µt+1 =µtηPLLl +µt(1−η)PLLh + (1−µt)ηPHLl + (1−µt)(1−η)PHLh
=S(µt)+
[
y˜−β(γH −γL)(1−S(µt))
][ µt
γL
+ 1−µt
γH
]
(1−S(µt)) (7)
where y˜= θ˜(ρλ− (1−λ(1+φ))). The change in the fraction of L-types can be
obtained from equation (7) as:
4µt+1 = S(µt)−µt+Γ(µt) (8)
with
Γ(µt)=
[
y˜−β(γH −γL)(1−S(µt))
][ µt
γL
+ 1−µt
γH
]
(1−S(µt)) (9)
It is straight forward to see that Γ(µt)≥ 0 for all µt ∈ [0,1[ if each individual
spends at least some time committing crime. In the following, we are looking
for conditions under which the different traits coexist in equilibrium even if
all parents agree that the honest trait is preferable but, at the same time,
all parents devote some (individuum specific) fraction of their time to commit
crime.
We denote by µ(t,µ0) the path produced by equation (7) when the initial
condition is µ0, M the set of steady states and x¯≡ ( y˜−β(γH−γL))/γH the time
an honest individual spends on criminal activities when µt = 0.
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Proposition 1 Existence of steady states.
(i) µ∗ = 1 ∈M.
(ii) If oblique transmission is unbiased or positively biased (in favor of trait
L), then M = {1} and µ(t,µ0)→ 1 ∀µ0.
(iii) If oblique transmission is negatively biased (against trait L), two cases
may arise:
• For S′(1) > 11− y˜/γL , M = {µ∗,1} with µ∗ ∈ [0,1) and µ(t,µ0) → µ∗
∀µ0 6= 1.
• For S′(1)< 11− y˜/γL and x¯ small enough, then there exist at least two
interior equilibria, µ∗1 ,µ
∗
2 , with µ
∗
1 < µ∗2 < 1, such that: µ(t,µ0)→
µ∗1 ∀µ0 <µ∗2 and µ(t,µ0)→ 1 ∀µ0 >µ∗2 . For x¯ large enough, M = {1}
and µ(t,µ0)→ 1 ∀µ0.
(iv) If oblique transmission is conformist and x¯ is small enough, then there
exist at least two interior equilibria, µ∗1 ,µ
∗
2 , with µ
∗
1 < µ∗2 < 1, such that:
µ(t,µ0) → µ∗1 ∀µ0 < µ∗2 and µ(t,µ0) → 1 ∀µ0 > µ∗2 . For x¯ large enough,
M = {1} and µ(t,µ0)→ 1 ∀µ0.
Proof: See appendix.
Proposition 1 establishes that both traits can only survive if the desired trait
is easy to adopt through oblique transmission. Otherwise, even though par-
ents agree that honesty is desirable, as long as committing crime is economi-
cally profitable, the desired trait disappears. Figure 2 illustrates the cultural
dynamics for two different cases of proposition 1: (i) when the oblique trans-
mission function is negatively biased and there exists one interior rest point
and (ii) when there is conformism and there exist two interior steady states.
In all cases we have represented 4µ as a function of µ. We denote all steady
states: stable equilibria are marked with green circles and unstable ones
with red circles. Clearly, the honest type can survive even in a situation in
which all parents commit crime:
First, when the interaction with peers is negatively biased against ac-
quiring trait L, both traits L and H will survive in equilibrium. Second,
when the oblique transmission function is characterized by conformism, an
equilibrium with diversified culture characterized by a low share of the L-
trait exists. However, if the starting share of trait L in the population is
sufficiently large, then trait H will disappear. Notice that in both cases
(with conformism or a negative bias), multiple interior stable steady states
can emerge. Such a result explains why - depending on initial conditions
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- the economy may reach an equilibrium of assimilation or an equilibrium
with cultural diversity. This has important implications for the analysis of
suitability and effectiveness of deterrence policies against crime or policies
devoted to modify the values that children assign to different traits.
µ
∆µ
µ
∆µ
Figure 2: Negative bias with one interior steady state (left panel); Con-
formism with two interior steady states (right panel).
It is now interesting to see how the possible equilibrium multiplicity of
types translates into different individuum specific crime rates. The aggre-
gate share of criminal activities in period t is given by
x˜t =µtηxL,Lt +µt(1−η)xL,Ht + (1−µt)ηxH,Lt + (1−µt)(1−η)xH,Ht (10)
=
(
y˜−β(γH −γL)(1−S(µt))
)( (1−µt)
γH
+ µt
γL
)
Clearly, this share is monotonically increasing in the share of dishonest indi-
viduals µt in the economy. At the individual level, however, the contributions
of each group to the aggregate share of criminality differ substantially. Fig-
ure 3 illustrates the population weighted crime rates (i.e. each of the four
summands in (10)) as a function of µ and indicates the resulting steady state
levels when there is either a negative bias or conformism. We observe that,
despite the overall positive relationship between x˜t and µt, the contribution
of groups with the honest trait is monotonically declining: The positive effect
on crime through increases in the share of dishonest individuals is not large
enough to offset the reduction in the population weight of these groups.
The multiplicity of interior steady states can be considered as a novel
explanation for understanding the existence of a differential in criminal ac-
tivity across place and time (see e.g. Glaeser (1998), Glaeser and Sacerdote
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(1999) and Grogger and Willis (2000)). In fact, there exists considerable vari-
ation in US crime rates, with center cities showing more criminality than
suburbs. For example, the property crime rate in center cities is three to two
times larger than that in the suburbs (Grogger and Willis, 2000).
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Figure 3: Population weighted crime rates with negative bias and one in-
terior steady state (left panel, S(µ) = µ2); Population weighted crime rates
with conformism and two interior steady states (right panel, S(µ)= µ2/(µ2+
(1−µ)2)). Parameters: θL = 1.8, θH = 2, γL = 0.5, γH = 1, ρ = 0.7, λ = 0.5,
β= 0.1, φ= 0.4.
2.4 Comparative static analysis
Let us now consider some comparative static results. We are in particular
interested in changes in the apprehension probability ρ (e.g. through an
increase in crime deterrence expenditures) and in changes in the relative
evaluation of both types γH −γL (e.g. by increasing parents’ awareness of
the importance of honest behavior).
Consider first changes in ρ. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the cultural dy-
namics resulting from different levels of ρ and the corresponding average
shares of criminal activities both under negative and frequency-dependent
transmission. If the apprehension probability is low (solid lines), µ = 1 is
the only stable equilibrium and average steady state crime levels are high.
Increasing the apprehension probability clearly not only has a direct posi-
tive effect on crime reduction by lowering economic incentives (the standard
deterrence effect)17 but also a social multiplier effect resulting from changes
17In fact, there is a long-established relationship between the probability of apprehension
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in the number and properties of steady state equilibria. This amplifying ef-
fect emerges as a decrease in the share of criminal activities increases the
probability of individuals adopting the honest trait. The larger is the share
of honest individuals in the economy, the lower is the share of criminal activ-
ities. This positive feedback process terminates at a new steady state with a
lower share of dishonest individuals in the population and a lower share of
criminal activities. Graphically, the standard effect implies the downwards
shift of the curve x˜(µ), while the multiplier effect reflects the transition to
a new lower stable steady state determined by the shifted curve. If the in-
crease in ρ is sufficiently large, economic conditions prevent parents from
committing crime which in turn implies that µ = 0 is a stable steady state.
The reason is that, with a negative bias, children always have a higher proba-
bility of adopting the good type whereas it depends on the relative frequency
of types with conformism.
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Figure 4: Changes in ρ with negative bias. Dynamics (left) and average
share of criminal activity (right).
Now, consider an increase in the parents’ awareness of the relevance of
the honest trait, i.e. γH −γL. With a negative bias this always increases the
share of honest types in the steady state and decreases the average share
of criminal activities. Figure 6 illustrates the cultural dynamics resulting
from different levels of the the parents’ awareness and the corresponding
and criminal outcomes dating back to the seminal contribution by Becker (1968). Moreover,
this relationship has found strong empirical support in many countries (see e.g. Di Tella and
Schargrodsky (2004), Draca et al. (2011) and Levitt (2004)) For the US, Imrohoroglu et al.
(2004, 2006) and Engelhardt et al. (2008) use calibration methods and data on property
crimes to show that the apprehension probability is one of the most important factors to
explain variations over time in thee crime rates.
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Figure 5: Changes in ρ with conformism. Dynamics (left) and average share
of criminal activity (right).
average crime rate under negative bias. In particular, for γH −γL = 0 (solid
line), the crime rate is independent of µ as the parents’ decision to commit
crime has no effect on the transmission process. By contrast, if relative dif-
ferences of type evaluations are sufficiently large, parents’ concerns about
their children’s well being prevents them from committing crime, which in
turn implies that µ = 0 is a stable equilibrium. With conformism (see fig-
ure 7), the effects of increasing parents’ awareness are qualitatively similar
to reductions in ρ. The same conclusion can also be reached for the com-
parative static effect of decreasing the share of income that can be stolen,
λ. The important policy implication is that crime deterrence policies and in-
formation/education policies shaping the evaluation of types by parents are
substitutes in fighting criminal behavior.18
Finally, we consider two exercises related to income growth and inequal-
ity. The first one consists of an increase in the average market income
through increases in individuals’ productivities (θH and θL) while leaving
the level of inequality (the skill premium θH /θL) unchanged. Such an in-
crease in the average income has a direct positive effect on criminal activ-
ities by increasing the net return from committing crime.19 However, like
in previous exercises, there also exists a social multiplier effect derived from
the cultural transmission mechanism as a higher share of criminal activities
increases the children’s probability of adopting the dishonest behavior. As a
18See also section 3.
19The marginal cost of committing a crime increases less than the marginal benefit as the
part of the marginal cost determined by the cultural transmission process remains fixed
(see equation (6)).
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Figure 6: Changes in γH−γL with negative bias. Dynamics (left) and average
share of criminal activity (right).
result, a new steady state with a higher share of dishonest individuals in the
population and a higher crime rate arises. Graphically, these changes could
be plotted as in figures 6 and 7 but with curves moving into opposite direc-
tions. The finding that a higher average income increases crime stands in
contrast to the theoretical predictions in Conley and Wang (2006), who show
that income growth that affects all members of a society equally has no im-
pact on the equilibrium level of crime. One important difference between
the two models, however, is that moral values are endogenously determined
in the present paper whereas they exogenously given in Conley and Wang
(2006).
The second exercise consists of an increase in individuals’ productivities
such that the skill premium θH /θL (the level of inequality) rises while the
average market income remains unchanged. In this case, net benefits of
committing crime increase for low ability individuals, thus rising their time
share spent on criminal activities, but decrease for high ability individuals,
which in turn reduces their criminal activities. Notice that for a sufficiently
large increase in inequality, highly productive individuals will quit their
criminal activities. Up to this point, large increases in inequality would
thus increase the incentives of low ability agents to commit more crimes and
so the aggregate crime rate in the economy would increase. Related figures
of such changes would be similar to those derived from an increase in the
average income. These predictions provide a theoretical explanation for a
positive relationship between property crime and income inequality which
is generally supported by empirical evidence (see e.g. Freeman (1996, p.33),
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Figure 7: Changes in γH−γL with conformism. Dynamics (left) and average
share of criminal activity (right).
Demombynes and Oezler (2005) and references therein).20 Furthermore, our
theoretical findings are in line with Chiu and Madden (1998) who show that
an increase in inequality unambiguously increases property crime. In their
model, in which moral considerations are absent, income inequality affects
property crime by rendering legal work less attractive for poor individuals
and by increasing the potential proceeds from crime.
3 Public education campaign
This section analyzes the effectiveness of public education campaigns used to
emphasize the importance of norms of good conduct.21 Following Hauk and
Sáez-Marti (2002), we assume that children are first exposed to the influence
of their parents before undergoing public education. Hence, only children
who have not adopted their preferences through direct socialization by their
parents can be affected by public education. An education campaign consists
of a publicly chosen effort level κ ∈ [0,1] which is assumed to be equal to the
probability with which a child adopts honest preferences in school.22 Public
20Note, however, that few studies also report a negative relationship between inequality
and crime, see e.g. Brush (2007) and Chintrakarn and Herzer (2012).
21See Lochner (2011) for a survey on the relationship between crime and education.
22Clearly, we make two simplifying assumptions: first, we assume that the education
campaign only affects the cultural transmission process but leaves individuals’ productivity
unchanged. Allowing for an explicit process of human capital formation is beyond the scope
of this paper. Second, we assume that the public education campaign is exogenously given
without stating how it is financed. This is not restrictive, however, since we might assume
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education efforts affect the probabilities of honest and dishonest children as
follows:
PLLk = xL,kt + (1− xL,kt )S(µt)(1−κ) (11)
PLHk = (1− xL,kt )((1−S(µt))(1−κ)+κ) (12)
PHHk = (1− xH,kt )((1−S(µt))(1−κ)+κ) (13)
PHLk = xH,kt + (1− xH,kt )S(µt)(1−κ) (14)
As before, the parents’ time spent on criminal activities xi,kt , (i = H,L, k =
h, l), determines the probability of children adopting the dishonest trait (eqs.
(11) and (14)). With the complementary probability 1− xi,kt children remain
naive and acquire the bad trait through society (with probability S(µt)) given
that public education fails (with probability 1−κ). By contrast, a child will
be honest if it does not acquire the bad trait from either his/her parents or,
if public education fails, from his/her peers (eqs. (12) and (13)).
The parents’ optimal fraction of time spent on criminal activities is now:
xi,kt =
1
γi
(
ρλθ˜− (1−λ(1+φ))θk−β(1−S(µt)(1−κ))(γH −γL)
)
(15)
with k = h, l and i = H,L. The new change in the fraction of L-types with
public education is given by:
4µt+1 = S(µt)(1−κ)−µt+Γ(µt) (16)
with
Γ(µt)=
[
y˜−β(γH −γL)(1−S(µt)(1−κ))
][ µt
γL
+ 1−µt
γH
]
(1−S(µt)(1−κ)) (17)
It is straight forward to see that Γ(µt) > 0 for all µt ∈ [0,1] if each individ-
ual spends at least some time committing crime. The introduction of public
education has two effects: its direct effect is to increase the proportion of
honest agents, while its indirect effect is to decrease parents’ time spent on
criminal activities which in turn reinforces the direct effect. Note further
that 4µt+1 > 0 if µt = 0 and 4µt+1 < 0 if µt = 1. These observations imply:
Proposition 2 Suppose that the government runs a public education cam-
paign, i.e. κ ∈ (0,1]. Then, there exists at least one interior equilibrium µ∗
such that µ(t,µ0)→µ∗ for all µ0.
that the required tax revenue is collected by a lump sum tax. Extending the present model
to capture general equilibrium effects arising from the public provision of education is an
interesting topic left for future research.
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The above analysis establishes the existence of at least one interior steady
state such that honest and dishonest types, and therefore groups with high
and low criminality, co-exist in society. Importantly, with a public educa-
tion campaign, the existence of interior rest points no longer depends on
the children’s bias. In fact, even with unbiased horizontal transmission (i.e.
S(µt) = µt) culture remains diverse. However, as in proposition 1, the func-
tional form of S still affects the number and stability of interior equilibria.
Figure 8, for example, illustrates the cultural dynamics and the average
share of criminal activities with conformism for different intensities of the
education campaign. The solid lines correspond to κ = 0. Clearly, if society
is initially in the high crime steady state, an intensive education campaign
with a high enough κ is successful in fighting crime as it affects affects the
population dynamics and the proportion of honest individuals increases.
The crime reducing effect of education is well documented by empirical
evidence, see Lochner and Moretti (2004), Lochner (2004), Deming (2011)
and Anderson (2014). Lochner and Moretti (2004), for example, find that if
the average years of schooling increase by one year then, both violent and
property crime decline by about 11-12 percent, while Deming (2011), using
data from public school choice lotteries, shows that peer effects may account
for gains in school quality implying a significant decline in criminality. Fi-
nally, Anderson (2014) estimates that if the the compulsory schooling age in-
creases from 16 to 17 or 18 years of age then, arrests at these ages reduce by
nearly 10 percent, with similar impacts on both property and violent crime.
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Figure 8: Changes in κ with conformism. Dynamics (left) and average share
of criminal activity (right).
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4 Empirical application
The aim of this section is to emphasize the relevance of our theoretical find-
ings by accounting for some empirical facts which characterize criminality
in the United States. Our analysis focuses on the evolution of the property
crime rates among US federal states during the period from 1975-2005.
The literature on crime economics has widely documented the reduction
in the number of property crimes in US in recent years. Simultaneously,
the increase in the size and the strength of deterrence programs has been
pointed out as one of the main factors contributing to this reduction (see e.g.
Imrohoroglu et al. (2004)). Figure 9 illustrate these two patterns by plotting
the dynamics of the property crime rate and total justice expenditures over
GDP from 1975 to 2005. Such aggregate numbers, however, may hide the
existence of large differential reductions in crime rates at the federal state
level. For example, states with similar crime rates in 1975 and similar de-
terrence policies over time may end up with completely different levels of
crime. These differences can either be explained by changes in other rele-
vant variables and/or the existence of the multiplier effect related to policies
as described in the previous sections. Specifically, the (non-)existence of such
an amplifying effect may explain why crime tends to be relatively persistent
in some states while it is more responsive to anti crime policies in others.
The objective of this section, however, is to assess the extent to which the
intergenerational cultural transmission mechanism is responsible for the
variance of changes in crime rates at the state level and how it accounts for
the decline in the aggregate crime rate.
We start by calculating property crime rates and total justice expendi-
tures by US federal states as a percentage of GDP for the time period under
consideration. Table 1 shows the values of these variables in 1975 and 2005.
We then divide states into ten groups according to their initial crime rate
in 1975. The first group includes states with the lowest crime rates, this is,
states which report crime rates less than 3,000 offenses per 100,000 habi-
tants. The second group includes states with crime rates between 3,000
and 3,500, and the following groups are defined by intervals which increase
by 500. In all states that belong to one of these nine groups, we observe
that crime rates decrease whereas justice expenditures increase.23 While
the overall pattern is thus similar to the one at aggregate level, there exist,
however, large differential reductions in crime inside each of these groups.
In order to discriminate between the underlying forces of these differ-
23Note that there is an additional group, group 10, where we summarized those states
that faced an increase in crime over the time horizon under consideration.
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ences, namely changes in relevant economic variables versus the social mul-
tiplier, we first calculate Gini indexes, per capita GDP and expenditures per
pupil for all groups in the time period under consideration. Table 2 shows
the average change and the coefficient of variation of average changes (per
group) of the Gini coefficient, GDP per capita and expenditure per pupil in
public elementary and secondary schools from 1975 to 2005. Clearly, these
variables have increased quite uniformly among all states.24 Notice that, ac-
cording to our theory, such changes imply positive effects on crime thereby
mitigating the effect of the improvements in the deterrence policy.25 Thus,
once we disregard differences in economic variables as the main forces ex-
plaining the differences in the crime rates patterns, we focus on the the
multiplier effect derived from the application of the deterrence policy as a
plausible mechanism to account for the differences in the drop in crime rates
among US states.
According to our theory, increases in crime deterrence expenditures may
not only have a direct effect on crime by altering economic incentives, but
may also have amplifying effects through changes in the transmission pro-
cess, depending on initial conditions (see figures 4 and 8). We may indeed
identify such amplifying effects in the data. For example, though starting
from similar initial crime rates and with similar economic changes, New
Hampshire (group 2) experienced a sharp decrease whereas the decline in
crime is more modest in Kentucky, Pennsylvania and Vermont. Similar pat-
terns can also be found for Connecticut and New York (group 5), Rhode Is-
land (group 6), Massachusetts (group 7). On the other hand there are cases
in which some states experienced only a very modest decrease in crime rel-
ative to other states with similar initial crime rates and similar economic
and spending patterns over time, see for instance Wyoming and Montana
(group 3) and Georgia and Oklahoma (group 4). This pattern is consistent
with figure 5 in which increases in crime deterrence expenditures may only
affect economic incentives but do not alter the resulting steady state of the
dynamic process. Finally, we have the case in which states starting with sim-
ilar crime levels and applying the same policies are split into two different
subgroups with different trajectories, see for example Michigan, Delaware
and California which experience similar and larger reductions in crime than
Colorado and Oregon (group 8).
Relative changes in other unobservable variables may also contribute
24We have also calculated the coefficient of variation for the Gini coefficient, GDP per
capita and education expenditures per pupil for each state. These results confirm our con-
clusion that economic variables show a similar movement across states and time.
25In fact, group 10 which includes those states that experienced increases in the crime
rate also experienced the largest increase in income inequality.
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to the differential decrease in crime rates such as, for example, changes in
the parents’ awareness of the importance of transmitting the honest trait or
changes in the size of the moral cost of committing crimes. However, we have
not found any evidence suggesting that there have been large differences in
the behavior of these variables over time and space.
Summarizing, the analysis of the available empirical evidence suggests
that the multiplier effect derived from the cultural transmission of traits is a
leading force in explaining the large differences in the evolution of the crime
rates among the US federal states (see also Glaeser et al. (2003)).
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Figure 9: US federal state property crime rates and total justice expendi-
tures (as % of GDP) 1975 - 2005. Source: UCR, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/,
Bureau of Justice Statistics, own calculation. Total justice expenditures are
approximated by an unweighted average of total spending by federal states.
5 Conclusions
This is the first paper to theoretically account for the intergenerational na-
ture of criminal behavior. To do so, we have considered a dynamic model of
cultural transmission of moral norms. Individuals with heterogenous pro-
ductivities allocate their time endowment to work in the market sector and
to commit crime. The decision to commit crime, in turn, has a direct negative
impact on the socialization process within the family (the child’s probability
of adopting norms of good conduct). We show the existence of high and low
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crime equilibria. Furthermore, we find that both traits, honesty and dishon-
esty, can survive even if all parents commit crime but at the same time agree
that honesty is desirable. This equilibrium multiplicity provides a novel
explanation of why crime is highly concentrated in specific areas (‘ghetto
culture’) and why crime rates tend to be persistent over time. Specifically,
our model may explain why states or communities with the same initial
crime rates and similar economic conditions and crime deterrence policies
over time may end up with completely different levels of crime. The reason
is that in our model crime deterrence not only alters economic incentive to
commit crime but may also directly affect the socialization process and thus
have long-lasting and amplifying effects (‘the social multiplier’) depending
on initial conditions. Similar effects arise from policies aimed at shaping
the evaluation of types by parents. Moreover, we have shown that a public
education campaign which is used to emphasize the importance of norms of
good conduct is an effective tool to reduce crime by increasing the share of
honest individuals in society and by altering the existence of steady state
equilibria.
Our model could be extended in two natural ways: first, one may as-
sume that not only moral norms are determined through a process of cul-
tural transmission but also individuals educational achievements or work
habits (see Sáez-Marti and Zenou (2012)) which are affecting the opportuni-
ties to earn legal market income. Second, allowing for an explicit process of
human capital formation (as e.g. in Lochner (2004)) where public education
is financed by taxes on wage income enables one to address the distributional
consequences of criminal behavior and anti crime policies.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1:
(i) It is straight forward to see that4µ= 0 if µ= 1. Just note that S(1)= 1.
(ii) Since S(µ) ≥ µ and Γ(µ) > 0 for all µ ∈ [0,1[, µ = 1 is the only possible
steady state. If we evaluate the derivative of 4µ with respect to µ at
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µ= 1, we get
d(4µ)
dµ
|µ=1 = S′(1)(1− y˜/γL)−1 (18)
so that µ= 1 is stable whenever S′(1)< 11− y˜/γL .
(iii) As has been shown in (ii), the condition S′(1)< (>) 11− y˜/γL ensures that
µ= 1 is a locally (un)stable equilibrium. Also, we have 4µ> 0 at µ= 0.
Consequently, if µ = 1 is unstable, there is at least one stable interior
rest point. If µ = 1 is stable, however, there is either an even number
or no interior steady states depending on the size of 4µ evaluated at
µ= 0, i.e. the size of x¯.
(iv) With frequency dependent transmission, µ = 1 is always a locally sta-
ble equilibrium as S′(1)< 1 (see also (ii)). The existence of interior rest
points and their stability properties follow analogous to (iii).
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1975 2005
state crime rate justice exp (% of GDP) crime rate justice exp (% of GDP)
G 1 North Dakota 2284 0.49 2025 0.93
South Dakota 2534 0.66 1767 0.88
G 2 Kentucky 3000 0.69 2531 1.23
Pennsylvania 3020 0.89 2422 1.38
New Hampshire 3247 0.78 1839 0.95
Vermont 3386 0.97 2370 1.25
G 3 Maine 3740 0.76 2419 1.07
Iowa 3768 0.57 2845 0.94
Wisconsin 3824 0.81 2669 1.42
Wyoming 3952 0.54 3158 1.77
Idaho 3937 0.70 2697 1.33
Montana 3999 0.73 3146 1.47
Minnesota 4092 0.69 3088 1.04
G 4 Virginia 4166 0.84 2649 1.07
Georgia 4167 0.90 4145 1.21
Oklahoma 4275 0.66 4047 1.24
Kansas 4469 0.73 3806 1.16
Ohio 4506 0.78 3668 1.36
Indiana 4579 0.60 3460 1.00
G 5 Connecticut 4689 0.85 2579 0.99
New Jersey 4731 1.15 2337 1.39
New York 4779 1.31 2102 1.60
Utah 4881 0.72 3837 1.33
Missouri 4904 0.83 3929 1.12
Texas 5017 0.62 4319 1.10
Illinois 5033 0.82 3092 1.13
G 6 Maryland 5198 1.16 3551 1.44
New Mexico 5305 0.78 4132 1.72
Rhode Island 5342 0.94 2728 1.38
G 7 Massachusetts 5635 1.11 2358 1.07
Alaska 5657 1.08 3615 1.49
Washington 5750 0.83 4890 1.18
Hawaii 5808 0.72 4800 1.22
G 8 Michigan 6115 1.00 3098 1.50
Colorado 6212 0.80 4041 1.15
Delaware 6276 0.89 3118 1.09
Oregon 6314 1.01 4402 1.44
California 6549 1.29 3321 1.73
G 9 Florida 7033 1.12 4013 1.68
Nevada 7474 1.46 4246 1.53
Arizona 7794 1.31 4827 1.58
G 10 West Virginia 1946 0.55 2633 1.25
Mississippi 2095 0.71 3274 1.29
Alabama 3080 0.71 3900 1.17
Arkansas 3192 0.58 4068 1.30
North Carolina 3380 0.81 4080 1.05
DC 5929 1.53 4490 0.79
Nebraska 3356 0.64 3432 1.01
Louisiana 3645 0.76 3696 1.29
Tennessee 3874 0.81 4300 1.12
South Carolina 4130 0.92 4370 1.11
Table 1: Property crime rates and justice expenditures (as % of GDP) in 1975
and 2005. Sources: UCR, Bureau of Justice Statistics.30
Gini coefficient GDP per capita Expenditures per pupil
Av. change Coef of Var. Av. change Coef of Var. Av. change Coef of Var.
G 1 22.26 0.05 88.52 0.35 105.05 0.15
G 2 26.14 0.10 98.90 0.18 146.50 0.13
G 3 24.49 0.09 79.73 0.11 101.49 0.16
G 4 25.21 0.09 91.34 0.11 119.33 0.09
G 5 27.68 0.08 97.37 0.10 100.64 0.12
G 6 20.71 0.12 97.46 0.20 112.47 0.18
G 7 22.73 0.08 71.41 0.43 78.42 0.28
G 8 23.75 0.09 98.25 0.14 77.05 0.12
G 9 26.14 0.21 83.72 0.04 76.46 0.13
G 10 32.74 0.07 93.64 0.11 126.73 0.05
Table 2: Average change (per group) and (standardized) coefficient of varia-
tion of average change of Gini coefficient, GDP per capita and expenditure
per pupil in average daily attendance in public elementary and secondary
schools (in constant 2011-12 dollars) from 1975 to 2005. Groups are the
same as in table 1. Sources: Frank (2008), US Bureau of Economic Analysis,
National Center for Education Statistics and own calculations.
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